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CRIMINAL LAW-THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSFERRED
INTENT IN HOMICIDE
Sir Matthew Hale well states the problem involved in
transferred intent in writing that "if A. by malice forethought
strikes at B. and missing him strikes C. whereof he dies, tho
he never bore any malice to C. yet it is murder, and the law
transfers the malice to the party slain ... "1 The courts have
asserted this doctrine in cases of homicide resulting from a
blow or the use of a gun 2 or poison. 3 It has also been applied
in cases of arson 4 and burglary 5 and in tort actions.0 The
problem to be considered in this note is in what manner the
law explains the transfer of malice from one person to another
person toward whom no actual malice exists.
The answer has- come from a gradual building up of the
rationalization of the rule over a period of several hundred
years, and a number of the reasons will be enumerated. Blackstone, calling it implied malice, writes that the "previous
felonious intent" to kill makes the rule applicable,7 and Agnies
Gore's Case states that "the law joins the intention with the
event." 8 The fiction that "the intention follows the bullet"
has been used as a partial basis in a number of cases.9 In
introducing the ground of public policy, Wharton states that
it is the policy of society to protect life and to enforce justice
against persons having a state of mind which intends the killing
10
of one of its members.
When we turn to the field of torts, closely related to the
criminal law in this doctrine because of the o~iginal close
association of intentional torts with crimes," we find that the
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early law provided that a defendant whose act had caused harm
to another was prima, facie liable as a trespasser unless he
could show himself free from fault, a thing which he was unable
12
to do if he had an intention to harm anyone in a like manner.
The real basis of the rule in homicide cases 13 seems to be
that the actor has the kind of nzens rea necessary for an intentional murder;14 that is, he intends serious bodily harm or
death to a human being'5 and commits on C the same character
of act that he intended to commit on B. The intention of the
defendant is the clue; for if A, acting upon a justification
such as self-defense, fires at B and ldlls C instead, he will not
be held responsible. When, from a subjective standpoint, one
has a wrongful intent to kill, there exists a dangerous state of
mind which, when executed by the act,' 6 is conduct contrary
to the policy of society to protect life; and the actor should be
punished as if he had carried out the crime as originally intended.
The courts have overwhelmingly decided that the degree
of guilt is the same as it would be if the person intended had
been killed;17 and in some jurisdictions this means that the
defendant may even be guilty of murder in the first degree, if'RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (Tent. Draft, 1935) Commentary to section 10 (1).
" Although this paper is concerned only with transferred intent
in homicide cases, it is believed that this statement, and the rationalization which follows, are also true in other cases of transferred.
intent in torts and crimes.
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requirement of intent: People v. Keefer, 18 Cal. 636 (1861); as is
the intention to poison rats, where a person took the poison: See
Agnes Gore's Case, 9 Coke 81 a, 77 Eng. Rep. 853 (1611). 'But see
hypothetical cases in 20 IRISH LAW TIMES 276 (1886).
'For a discussion of the intent and the act being joined, see
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the statutes so allow.' 8 It necessarily follows that the same
defenses are available to the accused as he would have had if he
had killed the person whom he intended as the victim.1 9
Thus far, we have considered only the way in which
the law has applied the rule by transferring malice; but there is
support for other views. Wharton, for instance, suggests that
if the field were still fully open for development, the logical
result might be quite different, with an indictment for (1) an
attempt to kill B and (2) the negligent manslaughter of C.20
It is the opinion of the writer, however, that the established
doctrine is desirable, since, subjectively, the actor has a state of
mind which intends a homicide; and, objectively, that state of
mind has manifested itself in the external world in the death
of a human being.
E. DUpWARD WELDON
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